Gazprom Eyes Megafon Aquisition

Gazprom cherche à acquérir l'un des plus grands opérateurs de téléphonie mobile de Russie

Gazprom, le monopole russe de l'exportation de gaz, envisage d'utiliser ses structures pour acquérir Megafon, l'un des principaux opérateurs de téléphonie mobile du pays. Six sources distinctes connaissant bien le marché ont fait part à The Bell de ce projet de transaction. Selon l'une d'entre elles, Gazprom Media est le candidat probable pour le réseau de télécommunications.

• Megafon est l'un des actifs les plus intéressants actuellement en vente. L'opérateur de téléphonie mobile est actuellement détenu majoritairement par USM, le groupe de l'oligarque Alicher Usmanov, qui a vendu en 2021 la holding internet VK (VK est l'ancien groupe Mail.ru et comprend les réseaux sociaux populaires VKontakte et Odnoklassniki). VK a été racheté par Gazprom Media et la compagnie d'assurance Sogaz. Cette dernière est copropriétaire d'un holding médiatique concurrent, le National Media Group, contrôlé par Yury Kovalchuk, un autre oligarque russe et ami du président Vladimir Poutine.
• Fin janvier, le journal d'Usmanov, Kommersant, a rapporté qu'USM cherchait un acheteur pour Megafon. Le journal a identifié Rostelecom (la plus grande entreprise de télécommunications de Russie, qui compte Kovalchuk parmi ses principaux actionnaires) comme le soumissionnaire le plus probable. Selon Kommersant, Gazprom était plus intéressé par un réseau concurrent, Beeline de Vimpelkom.
• À eux deux, le National Media Group de Kovalchuk et Gazprom Media contrôlent une part considérable du marché russe des médias. Ils détiennent la totalité ou une partie des principaux actifs de ce secteur : chaînes de télévision, sociétés de production cinématographique et télévisuelle, stations de radio, magazines, sites web d'information, ressources de divertissement et studios de production. Kovalchuk et la structure médiatique de Gazprom sont copropriétaires de VK, l'une des plus grandes entreprises technologiques du marché russe. Ils cherchent maintenant à renforcer leur position sur ce marché en acquérant l'un des principaux opérateurs de téléphonie mobile.
• Dans le même temps, nous voyons Usmanov, qui était autrefois l'un des plus gros investisseurs dans les médias en Russie et à l'étranger (par exemple, jusqu'en 2018, il détenait 30 % de la célèbre équipe de football anglaise Arsenal), se désengager progressivement de ses entreprises en Russie et se retirer du marché des médias. Il n'est pas le seul. Outre VK, le groupe USM d'Usmanov a vendu le groupe informatique ICS Holding l'année dernière. ICS comprend des développeurs de sécurité informatique et des projets associés à la création d'un système de transmission de données par satellite en orbite basse. Après la vente de Megafon, les principaux actifs restants d'USM comprendront Metalloinvest, l'un des principaux producteurs de fer au monde, Udokanskaya Med, la plus grande société d'extraction de cuivre de Russie, et le journal économique Kommersant.

Pourquoi le monde doit-il s'en préoccuper ?

La vente de Megafon à Gazprom ou à Rostelecom est un nouveau chapitre de l'histoire de la construction du nouveau pouvoir vertical des médias en Russie. Les structures ayant des liens étroits avec l'État continuent de "capturer" le marché des médias. Tout d'abord, fin 2021, Gazprom Media a acheté le groupe Mail.ru. Ensuite, il n'y a pas si longtemps, nous avons assisté à la redistribution de Yandex (nous avons écrit en détail à ce sujet, par exemple dans cet article). Dans le cadre de cette transaction, le fondateur du géant technologique, Arkady Volozh, a transféré une partie de son entreprise à l'étranger, tandis qu'Alexei Kudrin, autrefois la figure libérale la plus en vue dans le cercle de Poutine, a rejoint la partie russe restante de l'entreprise.

A regulator leak helps us understand how censorship works on the Russian internet

Last week, several Russian publications (1, 2, 3) published analyses of a leak of working files and internal communications from Russia’s main Radio Frequency Center, the de facto executive arm of state communications watchdog Roskomnadzor. The center was attacked by Belarusian hackers back in November, but Roskomnadzor played down the scale and significance of the attack at the time. Journalists — who analyzed more than 1.2 terabytes of data — went on to explain how the regulator imposes its censorship on Russia’s internet and which instruments it uses to spy on social networks and the media.

• The center is based in a modest, two-story red brick building in a business center on the banks of the Moscow River not far from the heart of the Russian capital. This division of Roskomnadzor is mostly tasked with ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies. However, it has another important yet unacknowledged responsibility – every day, it monitors the Russian internet for any content that could pose a reputational threat to the Russian authorities. Staff at the center seek out content that criticizes Putin or speculates on his health (one journalistic investigation reported that Russia’s president often travels with an oncologist, ear, nose and throat specialists and critical care doctors). Other hot topics include criticism of the war, rumors of mobilization, protests in the regions and negativity toward officials.
• Roskomnadzor systematically monitors internet resources to find this information, but its accuracy is limited. The department has commissioned Russia’s leading technical university, MFTI, to develop Vepr, a system for spying on social networks and media sites using artificial intelligence. They hope that this will do more than automatically flag “points of information conflict,” or hot topics at the national or regional level. They also want to predict the spread of “information threats” and the emergence of protests; publish automatic denials; block content and send data to “authorized bodies.” According to iStories, Vepr should rival the sophistication of China’s Great Firewall and is planned to go into service by the end of 2024. This deadline will almost inevitably be delayed due to problems with attracting qualified talent to work on the project amid the current sanctions.
• In leaked correspondence, the GRFC contacted Yandex, Russia’s leading tech company. Yandex denies doing Roskomnadzor any favors. However, internal documents show that GRFC used Toloka, Yandex’s platform for developing neural networks where users can analyze huge quantities of data at a low cost. In addition, GRFC’s “clean internet” service uses the Yandex search API to analyze online content (in simple terms, an API enables developers to use ready-made tools from other developers). GRFC staff asked Yandex to increase the number of possible API requests per day, but the company refused.
• All “negative” content found by the GRFC team is passed on to the security services: the Prosecutor General, the presidential administration, the Interior Ministry, the FSB, the FSO and the National Guard, reported iStories’ Alesya Marikhovskaya.
• In addition, the GRFC was reportedly preparing lists of foreign agents for the Justice Ministry long before this status was widely utilized in the latter half of 2021. For example, information about The Bell was compiled two years before we were officially recognized as a foreign agent. A significant part of that dossier has yet to be “used.” In Russia, the status of a foreign agent is used to discredit journalists, public figures, media outlets and human rights organizations that do not toe the official line.

Pourquoi le monde doit-il s'en préoccuper ?

Analyzing these leaked documents helps us to understand exactly how censorship affects the Russian internet. Until now, we had no concrete details about the work of GRFC. Theoretically, any Russian citizen who criticizes the authorities online sees his activities passed through the state mechanism responsible for censorship. From there, the information is sent to the security forces. In this sense, the Russian internet is increasingly resembling its Chinese counterpart.

Former Russian governor gets record jail term for organizing murders

Former Russian Governor Sergei Furgal was sentenced last week to 22 years in a high-security penal colony. A jury convicted him of organizing two murders and an attempted murder in 2004-2005. Furgal became one of the 34 Russian regional heads and 19 serving governors to be prosecuted in post-Soviet Russia — and his sentence is the most severe in the country’s history.

• Furgal was regarded as “the People’s Governor” of the Khabarovsk region, a region in Russia’s Far East. He did not always enjoy such popular acclaim: in the 2018 elections, he was a Duma deputy from the LDPR and served as a convenient sparring partner for the serving governor. He then unexpectedly won an election to become governor, largely because he was an attractive alternative candidate for the protest vote in the region. The Kremlin responded by stripping Khabarovsk of its status as the capital of the Far East Federal District.
• In his new role as governor, Furgal started attending local protests and criticizing local officials. His ratings soared and, at times, he was even more popular than Putin. Moreover, Furgal was popular beyond Khabarovsk and citizens across Russia spoke of him as a potential future president. For example, members of a focus group in Moscow noted his achievements (reducing salaries for officials, introducing free meals for children) and commented on his popularity in Khabarovsk. They also said that Furgal “doesn’t hide himself” (during the pandemic, Putin stopped appearing in public) and since “the people are for him,” he was doing all the right things.
• After Furgal was arrested in early July 2020, Khabarovsk residents organized constant protests in his defense, which lasted more than 150 days. But the popularity of these rallies gradually declined: if they started with crowds of 20-30,000 people, the last protests attracted 100-150 diehards. They were unable to save the governor and at the end of July, Putin named Mikhail Degryarev, another LDPR member, as interim governor. He had no connection to the region, which he had visited just once, and previously he stood as a spoiler candidate in Moscow’s 2013 and 2018 mayoral elections, coming in last both times. However, he won the 2021 Khabarovsk gubernatorial election against the backdrop of a purge of Furgal’s supporters and open antipathy toward the “incomer” from many local residents.
• The case against Furgal was largely built on the testimony of his former business partner and former deputy in the local Duma, Nikolai Mistryukov, who was arrested in 2019. The investigation believes that they organized the assassinations of Khabarovsk businessmen in 2004-2005 due to personal conflicts and business rivalries. Furgal pleaded not guilty. “Your honor, the verdict is clear. Only one thing is unclear: Aren’t you ashamed of this verdict?” the former governor said at his sentencing in Moscow.

Pourquoi le monde doit-il s'en préoccuper ?

Furgal is one of many Russian regional leaders to have ended up in jail. Less than a year after his arrest, the head of the Penza region, Ivan Belozertsev, was arrested. He now faces charges of bribery and illegal possession of weapons. “The position of a Russian governor is truly in the firing line,” prominent political journalist Farida Rustamova wrote on her Telegram channel.